Abstract This article briefly introduces the history and major policies of a massive community construction project launched by the People's Republic of China in the mid-1980s. Based on a literature review and field observations, the authors highlight four characteristics of this project: muddling through chaos, top-down control, regulated participation, and community as functional establishment. It is argued that the goal of the project is not to recreate, in China, a Western model of civil society, but to restructure the existing urban administrative structure so that it can adapt to new social demands. By transforming the grassroots neighbourhood organization -the residents' committee -into a welfare provider, this project is expected to ease the state's welfare burden while maintaining its political control.
Introduction
In the mid-1980s, the government of the People's Republic of China (China) launched a massive social engineering project designed to 'construct' community as a new social sector that could deal with the emerging social ills caused by rapid economic growth. In this paper, we will introduce the history and policies of the community construction 1 project and discuss some of its political characteristics in terms of social policy process. These characteristics include muddling through chaos, top-down control, regulated participation, and community as functional establishment. Although throughout the world it is common for governments to actively involve themselves in community building and development (Campfens, 1997) , it is unusual that the resultant communities are totally subservient to the state. We argue that community construction in China is a social engineering project by which the government can maintain control as the country shifts from a socialist planned economy to a socialist market economy.
China in the pre-community construction era: A brief history
From the early 1950s, people in both rural and urban China were organized through an extensive danwei (work unit) system (Lu, 1989) . At the same time, to stabilize the war-torn country and to limit massive rural migration to urban areas, the Communist government also established an urban household registration system (hukou) (Lu, 2002) . These two systems worked in concert to control mobility through strict administrative procedures, which required people to obtain written permission from their danwei in order to move around the country. Danwei and hukou effectively organized most people in a horizontal manner. China is a highly centralized country, however, and to vertically organize urban residents, China developed (in the 1950s) an urban administrative system that could manage and mobilize people. The system, which ranges from the provincial, municipal and district levels, to the street office, and on down to the lowest level, the residents' committee, is structured in a similar way to the Central Government. Almost all ministries of the Central Government have corresponding local bureaus in each level of the urban administrative system to implement their policies. Among all ministries, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA), with its unique mandate on grassroots governance, has played a leading role in the community-building movement (Figure 1 ).
The urban administrative system became intertwined with danwei, and together they formed a multifunctional matrix of control in urban China. Politically, it allowed the government to mobilize tens of millions of people in cities for various political movements, to control the mobility of people, and to enforce its policies on every city corner in the country. In terms of welfare, this matrix also provided a two-tier social security network that covered all citizens. Whereas danwei provided a form of occupational-based comprehensive protection to its members and their families, the urban administrative system, particularly through the street offices and the residents' committees, offered residual welfare services to those who were left out of the danwei system, such as widows and widowers, veterans, orphans, the disabled, and people affected by natural disasters (Dixon, 1981; Wong, 1998) .
In 1983, the Chinese Central Government -the National People's Congress, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State Council -finally endorsed the economic reforms that had been officially proposed in 1978. These reforms embraced the capitalist logic of economic growth, which led to many undesirable social consequences. Slowly but significantly, the economic reforms have dismantled the danwei system, as state enterprises, one after the other, went bankrupt or were downsized (Lee et al., 1999) . The unemployed and the laid-off were forced to turn to the urban administrative system for help, just as this system was also being overloaded by emerging social problems, such as drug addition, crime, family violence and child abuse.
Under these conditions, reform of the urban welfare system seemed inevitable. In the late 1980s, the MoCA, as the lead ministry for urban administration, decided to promote a policy of 'Societalization of Social Welfare' (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1988) . According to Wong (1995) , 'societialization', much like privatization, emphasizes the pluralistic nature of social welfare, from financing to delivery. In other words, the policy was to decentralize and download the welfare responsibilities of the State, Figure 1 Urban administrative system including the state enterprises, to other potential social sectors. In 1986, the MoCA officially proposed 'community' as one of these new sectors, and decided that it should be promoted and nurtured (Pan, 2004) .
Community construction in China: Overview of development and policies
The idea of community construction was not explicit until 31 May 1991, when the then Minister of Civil Affairs officially proposed a national plan for constructing communities in all cities (Wang, 2001; Pan, 2004) . Wang and his colleagues roughly divide the community construction process in China, in the period from 1991 to the present day, into three phases: experimentation, inauguration, and consolidation.
Experimentation phase
The first phase lasted from the official announcement of community construction on 31 May 1991 until 1995. During this period, the MoCA organized various national and regional seminars to popularize and discuss the policy. The first textbook on community building for all MoCA cadretraining institutes was published, and a few major policy achievements became noticeable. First, a new understanding of the administrative relationship between the relevant governmental constituents in the process was achieved:
1 the municipal civil affairs bureau would supervise the process; 2 the civil affairs branch of the district government would lead local community construction; and 3 the civil affairs unit of the street office would be the leader and organizer of the grassroots community construction process (Wang, 2001) .
Secondly, the 'community' was tentatively defined as a geographical entity, administratively positioned above the level of residents' committee and equivalent, but below the street office level. Thirdly, a new positioncommunity construction worker -was developed within the local MoCA's system. Fourthly, a most important policy decision was made when 'Suggestions About Accelerating the Development of Community Services' (1993 document; English unofficial translation; please see Choate, 1998) was collectively released by fourteen Central Government Ministries. The document not only signalled the Central Government's endorsement of the MoCA's community construction policy (which had until then been largely a departmental policy), but also confirmed the role of the community as a new sector to replace the crumbling two-tier social safety net.
Inauguration phase
This second phase lasted from 1996 to May 1998. In 1996, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) formally requested the MoCA and the Organization Department of the CCP to submit a policy proposal on community construction. In order to respond to this request, the MoCA organized a few seminars and conferences to explore the basic policy principles. One of the major principles adopted was proposed by the Shanghai municipal government in 1995, and summarized the new understanding of the urban administrative system as 'two levels of government (municipal and district), three levels of administration (municipal, district, and the street office) and four levels of implementation (municipal, district, street office and the residents' committee)'. This principle defined and justified the changing role of the street office and the residents' committee as frontline welfare providers. In 1998, MoCA efforts finally led to a formal recognition from the NPC and the CCP, which decided to include community construction as part of China's five-year economic and social development plan. In the same year, the State Council officially approved three requests from the MoCA: (a) confirmation of the MoCA's mandate for community construction; (b) approval for the MoCA to set up an internal coordination mechanism; and (c) approval for increasing personnel within the MoCA to actualize this mandate. These policy decisions not only ratified the efforts of the MoCA and many local governments, but also laid the legal foundations for a national movement. As a common political practice in China, the forwarding of a document by central governing bodies signifies its formal adoption as a national policy. The MoCA paper put forward five principles for community construction. They are that:
Consolidation phase
1 the community must provide services to individual residents; 2 all local government units must share and pool resources at the community level; 3 all local government units must combine their responsibilities and authority, so as better to coordinate and streamline the urban administration structure; 4 residents' self-governance must be allowed through the expansion of local democracy; and 5 community construction should be contextually appropriate to ensure its orderly progression (translation by the authors).
The document not only provides a formal definition of community as 'a common social sphere constituted by people living within a certain geographical parameter' (Pan, 2004, p. 21 , translated by the authors), it also specifies the community's responsibilities as a new social sector. These responsibilities are further spelled out in the 10 th Economic and Social
Five Year Plan approved by the People's Congress in 2001:
Pursuing community construction is an important element of China's economic and social development in the new era. Upholding the integration of the government's directives and social participation, a community administrative and operational mechanism can be established in a way mutually compatible with the socialist market economy. Community organizations and work teams must be strengthened and established. Community administrative functions should be expanded to take over the social functions and service responsibilities separated from business enterprises and government institutions. Spearheaded by the expansion of community services, the substances of community construction should be enriched, and the functions of the community are to be completed by developing community hygiene, prospering community culture, beautifying community environment, and strengthening public security. We need to work hard to construct new modernized communities equipped with comprehensive services, an elegant environment, decent public security, convenient living and harmonious human relationships. parameters for the community construction policy. In addition, it proclaims the formal status of the community as a new social sector within the new economy, and that it is expected that the community will take care of its members by providing a wider range of social services, including welfare services, education, party organization, public health and hygiene, public security, culture, birth control and environmental management (Wang, 2001) . To ensure the smooth implementation of this vast mandate, all government departments have become involved in local community construction. To coordinate all these departments at the local level, a new administrative system evolved under the leadership of the local MoCA system. To ensure the primacy of the CCP, in October 2000 then party leader Zhang Zemin proposed the establishment of a CCP branch in every community (Pan, 2004) .
Characteristics of community construction in China: Some observations
The above brief history may have already hinted that community construction in China is different from community-building projects in many other countries, which tend to emphasize the close tie between community and civil society. However, in China, this tie has not been explicitly referred to in government documents. Instead, community is always portrayed as a newly constructed social sector that is closely intertwined with the statecontrolled urban administrative system. Community construction is more or less a social engineering project initiated, coordinated and controlled by the state, which, as a policy process, shares some of the characteristics of Chinese Socialism, including muddling through chaos, top-down control, service-oriented development, and regulated participation.
Muddling through chaos: Strategic maximization and control of creativity Deng Xiaoping once described the tactic of economic reform as 'testing stepping stones while crossing a river', that is, trial and error. Perhaps this is also the best way to describe China's community construction. It took fifteen years from when the concept 'community' was first raised in 1986 to the day the Central Government officially endorsed community construction in the 2001 five-year plan. If we examine the 'muddling through' process carefully, we may notice that chaos is part of the calculation of the policy process in China. As Cheung and Iu (1995) conclude from their observation of the development of higher education policy in Southern China, the Chinese Central Government always allows for a wide range of implementation trial and error at the local government level, before they ultimately determine a national policy. As demonstrated in the community construction policy, this 'muddling through' process has always been softly regulated by the MoCA using conferences and meetings, and a 'model and award' approach (Choate, 1998) . After Shanghai's experiment in the early 1980s, the seeds of community construction, particularly in the context of community service, were sown all over China. However, China is a vast country with huge geographical and economic variation among its cities. The MoCA realistically acknowledged, therefore, the need for more than one model of community construction. To maximize the creativity of local bureaucrats and to ensure contextual appropriateness, local experiments were encouraged. Consequently, experimental communities rapidly flourished in various cities. Chaos seemed inevitable, but instead of regulating this massive experiment, the MoCA tried to encourage different initiatives. Close monitoring was carried out in a soft way, mainly through MoCA efforts in organizing conferences, symposia and seminars to inspect, encourage, and summarize local experiences (for example, Wuhan in 1986 , Hangzhou in 1989 , Tianjing and Hangzhou in 1992 , Shanghai in 1994 , Nanjing and Beijing in 1996 , and Qingdao in 1997 . Innovative and useful ideas were rewarded and promoted.
In 1999, when the Central Government was ready to endorse community construction as a national policy, the MoCA quickly tightened its control. It issued a consultation document to develop criteria to regulate local community construction experiments. Later, it also selected twenty-six urban districts as model communities, which became the prototypes for other cities to copy. Of these twenty-six models, some of them have received more attention than others. Some authors have tried to narrow down to three (Pan, 2004) , four (Derleth and Koldyk, 2004) , or nine (Wang and Liu, 2004) . Among them, the Shanghai, Shenyang, Qingdao and Wuhan models have received the most attention. For details of the twenty-six models, please refer to Derleth and Koldyk (2004) .
In August 2001, the MoCA summarized the experiences of these models and issued the document, 'The Basic Standard for National Community Construction in Model Cities' (For the original Chinese document see http://www.mca.gov.cn/artical/content/WSQ_ZCWJ/20031229144919.htm). Using this standard, the MoCA awarded 175 communities as model communities; chaos was more or less turned into patterned models. The soft monitoring model seems to have been successful. On the one hand, it provides the space for local governments and cadres to take the initiative so as to maximize their creativity and contextualize the idea within local conditions. On the other hand, by making this initiative a matter of departmental policy, it provides a buffer for the Central Government in case things turn sour.
However, to complete the process it is important for the Central Government to increase its recognition of the project, for at least three reasons. First, recognition legitimizes and rewards the efforts of the MoCA as leader of this social engineering project. As is the case in many other countries, government departments in China always compete among themselves for resources. The legitimacy conferred by official recognition not only stabilizes this internal competition, but also streamlines all departments in a unified effort to achieve policy goals. Secondly, having maximized the creativity of local governments and bureaucrats, recognition offers an opportunity for the MoCA to align and standardize the local practices, which vary not only from province to province but also from city to city and even from district to district. Thirdly, in a country that has a notorious record of political movements and instability, official recognition is a big comfort to many local players, particularly those local MoCA officials who creatively tested the limits of 'community construction', in terms of affordability and willingness of local residents and, more importantly, its political implications for Chinese Socialism.
Top-down control: Elaboration of existing urban administrative systems
While the community construction process was muddling through from local experiences to national policy, state control was always tight. In order to turn a departmental initiative into a national project, the MoCA must first gain the Central Government's confidence that it has safely secured the control of communities, particularly through the top-down governance mechanism of its existing urban administrative system. The existing mechanism has proven successful in previous social movements. To ensure that it remains in control, the MoCA first renamed the Department of Grassroots Governance Construction, which had been in charge of the development of residents' committees, the Department of Grassroots Governance and Community Construction, to reflect its new mandate of overseeing the entire community construction process. At the municipal, district and street office levels, guiding and steering committees were set up to ensure the compliance of all levels within the urban administrative system.
Top-down control can be seen in a community construction slogan, which emphasizes modifying the 'community institutional infrastructure (tizhi)'. In fact, innovation of tizhi has become the major criteria of model selection (Derleth and Koldyk, 2004; Pan, 2004; Wang and Liu, 2004) . In other words, community construction is not about building either a physical or social community. Rather, its overwhelming concern is the elaboration of the existing urban administrative system, the tizhi, by reallocating more responsibilities to the modified residents' committees, redefining the relationship and boundary between the residents' committees and the street offices, and re-securing the control of the residents (Sun, 2003) . Residents' committees were designed as a social control mechanism; therefore, they tended to be small in size. The [2000] 23 rd Document operationalized the definition of community by stating 'urban community generally means the geographical constituency of the newly modified residents' committees after the community institutional restructuring' (translation by the authors). Corresponding to this new mandate, many residents' committees have been merged into larger bodies, ranging from 1000 to 3000 households in size, in order to ensure that they have sufficient resources to provide services to their members. Meanwhile, the reduced number of residents' committees can also be more effectively managed. As a result, the number of urban residents' committees dropped from 112,000 to 85,000 (Pan, 2004) . Through the notion of 'two levels of government, three levels of administration and four levels of implementation', communities have been turned into collaborators of the urban administration, and are formally positioned as the lowest rank actors in policy implementation (Choate, 1998) . They have become local sites in which government activitiesfrom hygiene, social services, environmental protection and public security to party organizing, culture and birth control -are centred. Operated mainly by retired cadres who are exhausted by all the requirements passed down by various government departments, and with minimal authority and resources, residents' committees have effectively become the operating arms of local government (Pan, 2004; He, in press ).
Regulated participation: A Chinese understanding of democracy Nevertheless, residents' participation is critical to the success of community construction (Wang, 2001; Li, 2002; Pan, 2004) . Residents' committees were first experimented with by the Hangzhou municipal government in 1949, and were later adopted by the Central Government as standard grassroots institutions in urban China (Pan, 2004) . From its early days, the residents' committee has always been defined as a self-governing, elected grassroots democratic body. However, the election method is unique in at least three ways, in that it features: (a) government-appointed candidates, (b) an indirect multi-tier election process, and (c) limited suffrage.
In 1989, the Chinese government enacted new legislation for the organization of urban residents' committees, reaffirming the residents' committee as a self-managing, self-educating, self-servicing, self-governing grassroots institutional entity. However, the Chinese government has always been very cautious of any call or move that may lead to political reform. Hence, on the one hand, the community construction policy recognizes that enhancing participation of its members can empower the residents' committees to perform their newly assigned role. On the other hand, the 1989 legislation also spells out clearly that residents' committees operate under the guidance, support and assistance of the MoCA and local governments.
So far, only a few urban communities have experimented new forms of democratic election. In 1999, Shenyang, a major industrial city in Northeast China, conducted its first democratic election for several residents' committees. The election was an important step toward self-governance of the local community. In this election, old rules were broken. Instead of being appointed, candidates were nominated through a group process. Suffrage was expanded to each household. In 2000, learning from Shenyang, a few major cities, such as Shanghai, Nanjing and Qingdao, experimented with their own democratic, mostly indirect, elections for a small number of residents' committees (Li, 2002) .
However, the people's response to democratic elections has been lukewarm (Li, 2004) , for at least three reasons. First, despite the rhetoric, most communities are still under the direct control of bureaucrats, with the result that people do not feel the ownership of their community. Secondly, unlike people in rural China whose livelihoods are closely tied to their land, urban residents are economically detached from the community, particularly with the diminishing roles of danwei (Li, 2004) . Thirdly, the electoral system and procedure lack clarity. As Li (2002) concludes from her observations of several electoral experiments, rules and procedures were decided on by individual provincial or even municipal governments. Therefore, they vary greatly from one another.
Given the slow pace of development in local democratic elections, community in China can hardly be seen as a self-governing body. In addition, the jurisdiction of a residents' committee is always compromised by the influence of the local CCP branch. Contrasting with the slow development of democratic elections for resident's committees is the rapid expansion of local CCP branches. In June 2000, following his predecessor's speech, Chairman Hu Jintao passed down a directive that clearly stated that the core for the success of community construction must rely on a well-established local organization of CCP (see http://www.mca.gov.cn/artical/content/WSQ-LDJH/2004714173753.html). It instructed that all local urban communities must establish local CCP branches, which should play a leadership role in community decision-making processes. As a result, the grassroots governance structure has mimicked that of the Central Government, with the coexistence of a local CCP branch and an elected residents' committee. Thus, even when people in the community are keen on participating in their community, their participation is be ideologically regulated by the local CCP.
Functional establishment: Community service as dragon head The prime motivation behind China's community construction project is to ease the social burden on the state and its enterprises, and to tackle the social turmoil caused by economic reform. The Chinese government has never shied away from this practical intention. The [2000] 23 rd Document clearly and plainly spells out that community service is the 'dragon head' (or spearhead) of community construction. On careful examination of the history of the community construction project in China, we may notice that the project began with the MoCA's launch of a policy of developing 'community services' in urban China. The successful experience of the Shanghai municipal government's realignment and standardization of local welfare services was promoted and, by 1989, almost sixty-seven percent of street offices in China had started some community services. The 1993 Document further assured the importance of community service as the driving force of the community construction project. The Chinese idea of community service is much more complicated than what is common in the Western world (Xu et al., 2005) . In the 1993 Document, it was spelled out clearly that community services are tertiary sector economic activities. In addition to taking care of the welfare of people in the community, community services are also solutions to local economic problems, such as unemployment. The restructuring of state enterprises has led to a growing number of unemployed, laid-off and under-unemployed people in urban centres. To absorb this large crowd of people, the community is expected to provide economic opportunities for them. Therefore, the 1993 Document classifies community services into three categories: non-compensated, low-compensated and compensated. The latter two create local economic opportunities for entrepreneurial activities. To nurture and support these local activities, the 1993 Document also encourages local banks to finance business ventures to develop designated community compensated services. To regulate these ventures, each community is required to develop a reasonable price system for all fee-for-service community services.
Non-compensated community services also help temporarily resolve local unemployment issues. The expansion of community services is supported by a huge infrastructure and, by 1997, 5055 community service centres had been built. Another example is the Starlight Project, directly initiated by the MoCA in 2001 to mobilize communities to tackle the aging problem in urban China. In total, 1.97 billion Yuen (roughly US $238 millions) were expected to be raised, by pooling government, lottery and local resident resources. By 2004, when the project was officially completed, Starlight centres, 9888 in total, had been built in almost every community in urban China (see 2004 Statistics Report of the Development Civil Affairs Services at http://www.mca.gov.cn/artical/content/WGJ_TJGB/ 2005216113548.html).
This massive infrastructure provides a platform for service delivery and a physical symbol for the community. More importantly, a large number of under-qualified personnel, mostly unemployed or laid-off residents of the community, are hired at a very low wage to operate the infrastructure under the supervision of local MoCA staff from the street offices. Instead of remaining in the community as potential social threats, this newly created team of foot soldiers has become the operational arm of the MoCA and local governments. In brief, community service, the driving force behind community construction, not only takes care of the well-being of the needy in the community, but also provides a livelihood for hundreds of thousands of unemployed workers. However, as observed in Jinan, Shandong (Xu et al., 2005) and Wuhan, Wubei (Xu, 2004) , the impacts of marketization of community service has led to a disproportional growth of compensated and 'low-compensated' community services. The needy people, like seniors and children from low-income family, cannot enjoy the growth of community service.
Conclusions
This paper briefly introduces the history of China's community construction project. Presenting four characteristics of this project, we contend that community construction in China originated as a local initiative, the success of which captured the attention of the MoCA, which was struggling to fulfil its mandate to tackle social turmoil caused by economic reform. Following a muddling-through process, the MoCA turned this project from trial-and-error local experiments into a national policy, once it could assure the Central Government that a top-down control mechanism was in place that would allow the state to shift its welfare responsibilities to the modified residents' committee.
In conclusion, we argue that China's conception of community may not be understood from a Western tradition, which very often ties the notion of community closely to the idea of civil society (Etzioni, 1993; Giddens, 1998; Ife, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Yan, 2004) and liberal democratic politics (Friedmann, 2004) . The idea of construction is largely a social engineering concept, the operationalization of which, in this case, is to elaborate the urban administrative system by repositioning community -the modified residents' committee, once predominately a political surveillance and social control entity -as a social service provider. The rise of community may inevitably foster a more open society in China. However, research on and documenting of how people perceive and experience the changes led by community building are scant. Judging only from existing government documents and academic literature, we should not rush to any conclusion that a civil society, particularly in a Western sense, is emerging in China. Communities in China, as least for now, are constructed as part of the state administrative establishment.
